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Constitutional Limitations on the Conditions
of Pretrial Detention
American jails are populated primarily not by persons convicted of
crime, but by defendants awaiting trial who cannot purchase their
freedom with bail. The sole basis for detention under current law
is to ensure appearance at trial; if preventive detention for "dan-
gerous" persons becomes law, another potentially large group will be
subjected to detention pending trial.' In jail, these detainees are sub-
jected to the most severe deprivations and the crudest indignities
which exist in the entire penal system. In a recent sampling of con-
victed prisoners, twelve of thirteen preferred the penitentiary to the
jail in which they were held before trial.2
Until recently, there had been no challenge to the internal adminis-
tration of either prisons or jails. Because they feel it to be beyond
their special expertise, judges are reluctant to inject themselves into
the operation of a detention system.3 This past February, however, a
federal district court scrutinized the Arkansas Penitentiary System and
concluded that the whole system "as it exists today... is unconstitu-
tional."' 4 While conditions in Arkansas prisons may be worse than those
1. Although preventive detention exists de facto under current practice, explicit autho-
rization would almost certainly increase the number of persons confined prior to trial.
2. A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JuSTIcE: CoNsTrrrTioAL RIGrTs A N THlE C=MWBAL
PRocEss 83, 264 (1964).
3. Prisoners have been bringing suits challenging their imprisonment for a long time,
in considerable numbers, but they were rather consistently denied relief either on ju-
risdictional grounds or on the merits until quite recently. See, e.g., McCloke), v. Mary-
land, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964); Childs v. Pegelow. 321 F.2d 487, 4S9 (4th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932 (1964); Hatfield v. Bailleux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 US. 862; Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32, 34 (8th Cir. 1952); Siegel v. Ragan,
180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950). The first case to state the other
side of the argument, and to stand alone for years, was Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443
(6th Cir. 1944). For a discussion of the changing trends in the law and in the policy of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons regarding several aspects of imprisonment, see Barkin, The
Impact of Changing Law upon Prison Policy, THE PmSoN JoumAL 3 (spring.summer 1963)
[hereinafter cited as BAPMN]. Although only two years old, the article itself shovs holy
-luiddy the law has progressed since then. Barkin disapproves of "jailhouse" la.e-rs,
(id. at 18), but see Johnson v. Avery, 393 US. 483 (1969); he considers menu planning
one area in which prison administrators will be free of judicial scrutiny in the fore-
seeable future, but see Barnett v. Rodgers, 410 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
4. Holt v. Sarver, 38 U.S.L.W. 2462, 2463 (EM). Ark. Feb. 18, 1970). This decision
was the latest in a line of cases in which the court has tried to prod the -rkansas prison
system to reform itself. See Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1955);
Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (EM). Ark. 1967), rev'd in part 401 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.
1968); Holt v. Sarver, 300 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969). In all of those cases it was found
that unconstitutional practices were being carried on at the penitentiary, and injunctive
relief was granted.
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in other prison systems, they can hardly be worse than those found
in most pretrial facilities. 5 No court has yet developed standards to
evaluate pretrial incarceration, but the practice-"as it exists today"-
is vulnerable to serious challenge on constitutional grounds.0 This
Note examines these constitutional arguments in light of the existing
conditions in pretrial detention facilities.
I.
Each day, about one hundred thousand people in the United States
are being detained pending trial;7 in some states, over one third of
those imprisoned are detainees rather than convicts." The average
period of detention ranges in different jurisdictions from six weeks to
eight months.9 In New York, so many detainees have been held for more
than three months that the Second Circuit has held en banc hearings
to investigate.' 0
The important determinants of the conditions of the detainee's con-
5. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAiw ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OV JUSTICE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: CosumrIo-s 4, 24-25 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAsK FORCE RE-
PORT].
6. The Sixth Amendment, although of great importance for pretrial detainees, is not
discussed at length here. The right to a fair trial with the assistance of counsel, and the
freedoms needed to exercise that right, have already been guaranteed pretrial detainees,
at least in principle. See, e.g., Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); In
re Snyder, 62 Cal. App. 697, 217 P. 777 (1923); In re Rider, 50 Cal. App, 797, 95 P. 965
(1920). However, the conditions in jails often make this guarantee meaningless. The
arguments made here attack this aspect of the problem and will thus have indirect, but
important, effects on the Sixth Amendment rights of detainees.
7. This is an extrapolation from the fragmentary and incomplete reporting of facts
about detainees. In California on a random day in 1967 there were 9000 detainees In
jail; TASK FORCE REPORT 24-25. In New York City on April 1, 1970, there were 8,146 per-
sons in detention; N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1970, at 1, col. 7. Philadelphia had an average daily
population of 1,628 detainees on March 1, 1968; THE AMERICAN FOUNDATION INsTrrtrrtoN
OF CORREGTIONS, THE PHILDELPHIA DETENTION CENTER: AN EVALUATION AFTER FoUR YEAtS
oF UsE 13 (1968) [hereinafter cited as PHILA. DETENTION CENTER]. It has been estimated
that in 1965, approximately 88,000 juveniles were held in jails throughout the country.
Interview on March 20, 1970 with Mr. Mark S. Richmond, Assistant Director, Com-
munity Services Division, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, and Mr. R. A. Miller, Director, Jail
Services, U.S. Bureau of Prisons, on file at the Yale Law Journal [hereinafter cited as
Interview].
8. In Connecticut, 1,300 out of 3,000 jail and prison inmates in March, 1970 were pre-
trial detainees, according to State Commissioner of Corrections, Ellis McDougall. In Cali-
fornia, in 1967, 9,000 of 25,000 persons in jails were detainees. TASK FORCE RroiT 25.
9. TASK FORCE REPORT 25 (the average length of detention in New York City is 114
days); N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1970, at 35, col. 3. See PHILA. DErENTION CENTER 17.
10. N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 2, 1970, at 35, col. 4. The issue was brought up in a case In
which the appellant claimed that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial because
he had been detained over a year pending trial. United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann,
No. 473 (2d Cir., Apr. 1, 1970). The court discovered that 2,300 people then in detention
in the city had been awaiting trial for more than 3 months. It ordered briefs from the
district attorney's office, the local and state bar associations, and legal defense groups for
the en banc hearings to be held later in the spring.
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finement are the facilities in which he is kept, the personnel who super-
vise him, the provisions he is given, the work and recreational programs
offered him, and the communications which he is permitted to make."
The nature of the building may make for a miserable stay, regardless
of how the detainee is treated.'2 Detainees are generally held in jails
rather than prisons. Built by counties and cities, which are relatively
poor governmental entities, jails are often remnants of the last cen-
tury,13 when more retributive penal theories dictated harsh conditions.'
4
Jail cells are very small and almost always locked.15 When the jail be-
comes crowded, detainees have to share a cell with as many as seven
others.' 6 Cell assignments are often made at random, even when mis-
demeanants as well as detainees are kept in the jail.
17
These jails contain little besides the cells. They have no workshops
or recreation rooms inside, and no exercise area outside.28 The heat-
ing and lighting are bad and the sanitary facilities primitive:
11. The facts presented here on these areas are not an average of the best and worst
that pretrial facilities offer, but are striking examples of abuses which ex.st throughout
the system. Any one jail may not exhibit all of the problems, or it may suffer from some
of them in less severe form than noted here.
12. On the nature and age of jails, see Mattick & Aikman, The Cloacal Region of
American Corrections, 581 ANNALS OF THE AtMERICAN Ac.%_%tY OF PoL.TCAL AND SOCIAL
ScIENcEs 109, 110-11 (1969) [hereinafter cited as MATTrK & AiRMN].
13. Imprisonment was not a common form of punishment until the 19th century;
before that, serious crimes were punished by death or physical suffering, minor ones by
a fine or a day in the stocks. Each town's jail held everyone who was awaiting trial and
sentence. When imprisonment became popular as a punishment, jails became too aowded
and the states stepped in to build facilities. They were for those convicted prisoners with
long sentences, who did not have to be near the court and their home, as pretrial de-
tainees did. Counties and towns continued to use their old facilities for pretrial detainees
and short term prisoners. THE NORTH CAROLINA JAIL STUDY COMMISSION, A CIALXNcE TO
EXCELLENCE: LOCAL JAILs IN NORTH CAROLINA 34 (1969) [hereinafter cited as N.C. JAIL
CO~mm'N].
14. The conditions of life in jails have been denounced for several decades, though
to little avail. For a sample of the reports on jails, see IL.INoIs STATE CHAXRITIrS Co.xt-
MISSION, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT (1911); E. ABBOr, THE ONE HUNDRED AND ONE COUNTY
JAILS OF ILLINOIS AND WHY THEY OUGHT TO BE ABOLISHED (1916); J. FISIIMAN, CRUCIBLES
OF CRmE (1923); L. ROBINSON, JAILS (1944).
15. In some New York detention centers, prisoners are locked in their cells at all
times except for one hour when they can exercise in the "pen-like corridor on which
their cells front." A Study of the Administration of Bail in New Yorh City, 105 U. PA.
L REv. 693, 723 (1958).
16. Interview, supra note 7.
17. TASK FORCE REPORT 168; N.C. JAIL Co.rsI'N 29-,0; Interview, supra note 7.
Juveniles and adults are often assigned to cells together. TASK FORCE REPORT 24. Only
seven of one hundred North Carolina counties have separate facilities for juveniles.
Seventy-three of the counties house juveniles in the same cells as adults. Women are
held in open cells in full view of male guards and prisoners. N.C. JAIL Co.Mt'N 28-.29.
See NEv ROLES FOR JAILS- GUIDELINES FOR PLANNING 16 (M. Richmond, ed. 1969) fherein-
after cited as NEW ROLES FOR JAILS]. Some detainees are held in prisons, where the), are
segregated from the rest of the population. Ironically, this means that the), receive far
worse treatment than the other inmates. In jails, where there are few or no rehabilitative
or innovative programs, mixing of convicts and detainees is detrimental for detainees; in
prisons, however, the separation means that detainees suffer lack of access to the services,
cilities, and programs offered to the convicts there.
18. Interview, supra note 7.
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One New England state, for example, reports four jails having a
total of 899 cells without sanitary facilities. The construction of
many existing local institutions predated inside plumbing and
electricity; they still have slop buckets, bullpens, and unshaded
electric bulbs dangling from exposed fixtures.10
The jailhouse staff, paid at an extremely low rate,2 0 are seldom
qualified to operate these inadequate jail facilities. In four states, the
staff are hired by a state-wide civil service agency, and job placement
is based on an educational requirement and a merit system.21 In the
other states the guards are local or county officers, who often need no
qualifications to be appointed and who can be fired at any time.2 2 In
many small counties, the jobs are awarded as political patronage by
the elected sheriff. Some sheriffs, who are also law enforcement officers,
assign the jobs to the road deputies whose work on the highways has
been least satisfactory 23
The lack of preparation for managing a jail is seldom remedied by
a training program for wardens and guards during their period of em.
ployment.24 Nor, in most cases, do the guards serve long enough to learn
from experience. When they are political appointees, every election
puts their jobs in jeopardy. The patronage system, poor pay and bad
working conditions help to cause a complete turnover of jail personnel
in this country every five years.25 The changeover after an election is
accompanied by such rancor that outgoing jailors have been known
to throw away their keys and destroy their records. 20
Besides the physical condition of the jail and the quality of its staff,
detainees suffer from a lack of food, clothing, medicine, and exercise.
In one third to one half of all jails, the diet fails to meet minimum
daily caloric and nutritional health requirements; 27 many jails serve
only two meals per day, and those serving three may provide a dough-
19. TASK FORCE REPORT 166.
20. The salary is often a supplement to a retired man's social security income. Only
in New York and Los Angeles do the salaries average from $8,000 to $0,000 a year.
Interview, supra note 7.
21. Those states are Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island. N.C, JAI(,
COMt'N 7; Interview, supra note 7.
22. In 53% of the states, there is no education requirement for wardens or guards;
in the remainder a high school diploma is required. TASK FORCE REPORT 165; NEV ROLM
FOR JAILS 18.
23. Interview, supra note 7. TASK FORCE REPORT 164; MATricK & AIKMAN 112.
24. In 38% of the institutions, they do receive training-but only in the use of fircarm
and the censorship of correspondence. TASK FORCE REPORT 165.
25. Interview, supra note 7. TAK FORCE REPORT 164, MATICK & AirMAN 112, 116-17.
26. Interview, supra note 7.
27. Interview, supra note 7. The dietary conditions in jails violate the standards get
by the American Correctional Association over a decade ago. Tim AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL
ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 434-35 (1959).
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nut for breakfast, a dry bologna sandwich for lunch, and a vegetable
stew for dinner. Dieticians are extremely rare in jails, and the cook
may be the sheriffs wife.28 In a few states, the fee system still operates;
as a supplement to his salary, the sheriff is given a fund for the prisoners'
food and can keep for himself the money remaining unspent. -3 Unless
a detainee brings clothes when he enters the jail, he wears the clothes
he came in with until his release, since most jails do not have institu-
tional clothing.30
The detainee is generally not given a medical examination when he
is admitted to jail;31 injuries, chronic and contagious diseases, and drug
and dental problems often go untreated unless they erupt into an emer-
gency. Even then, help is not readily available. Instead of having a
doctor on the staff of the jail, the sheriff contracts for services with the
county medical department, whose doctor may live forty or fifty miles
away and be reluctant to come, knowing that he will get no fee
from his patient.
32
The need for some physical activity and recreation is recognized in
all correctional literature,33 but such activity is almost never provided
in jails. In a typical jail, the only gymnasium is the corridor which
runs along the cell block; the only inmates allowed out of their cells
are those who are considered docile by the guards and who have a
special skill, such as cooking or haircutting; and the only ones who get
outdoors are the "trusties" who wash the sheriff's car.
34
Detainees are also circumscribed in their communication with the
outside world. No written material comes in uncensored. 3z Detainees
generally cannot obtain the reading matter they request; their choice
is limited to the books sent over by the county library, if it cooperates
in a program with the jail.30 Mail is censored with the detainee's "con-
sent;" if a prisoner does not sign the consent form provided under
federal postal law, his mail is returned or held until he is released.3
28. Interview, supra note 7.
29. Interview, supra note 7. N.C. JAIL Comm'N SO.
30. Interview, supra note 7.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Tnr AEmRCAN CORREcnONAL ASSoCIATION, MANUAL OF CorREcrONAL STAr;DAm3
519 (1966) [hereinafter cited as ACA MANUAL); Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis
in Bail: 11, 113 U. PA. L Rrv. 1125, 1144 (1965).
34. Interview, supra note 7.
35. Interview, supra note 7; Foote, supra note 33, at 1144; A Study of the Adminis-
tration of Bail in New York City, supra n.15, at 723.
36. Interview, supra note 7.
37. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RULEs AND REGULATIONS COvELNING CUS-
TODY AND TREATMENT OF FEDERAL PRISONERS IN NONFEDERAL INSTrTo.s 2 (1969) [here-
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If he does sign, his mail is opened, inspected for contraband, and
scanned for content. A consenting detainee may ordinarily correspond
with his lawyer and his family; to correspond with anyone else, he
must get the special permission of the warden. In some states, the
warden may be overridden by the state commissioner of corrections."
Oral communication is restricted even more stringently. A detainee
is typically allowed no more than three phone calls when he is being
arraigned; 9 he may call his lawyer, his family and his employer. Once
in jail, the detainee has no access at all to a telephone. Visits to the jail
are permitted only to the detainee's family and his lawyers. 40 Visiting
hours are often inconvenient, and when visits do take place, the de-
tainee and his visitor are separated by a wall, with only a small window
or screen through which to see one another and a telephone device with
which to communicate.
41
The detainee is given no protection from these deprivations by fed-
eral or state governments. The federal regulations authorize certain
deprivations, but set no minimum standards for treatment.42 Only
forty per cent of the states set any standards for jails, and these focus
on construction and health.43 Officials in nineteen states are authorized
to conduct inspections, but only six states provide subsidies for needed
improvements which are recommended as a result of such inspections.
4 4
Thousands of innocent persons undergo the deprivations which re-
sult from inadequate facilities, supervision, provisions, and opportun-
ities for communication for months before the adjudication of the
charges against them is begun. The small segment" who return to
inafter cited as FEDERAL RES.]. The number of outgoing letters, and their destination,
are strictly curtailed too. Id.
38. Cf. Fulwood v. Cremmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d
970 (8th Cir. 1965).
39. Interview, supra note 7.
40. Even this is not always true. The federal rules for use by local jails holding federal
prisoners allow the warden to refuse to pernit a visit if he thinks it will "not be in the
best interest of society or might endanger the security of the institution." FEDERAt, Rros. 2.
41. TASK FORCE REPORT 24-25; Interview, supra note 7; A Study of the Administration
of Bail in New York City, supra n.15, at 723; Foote, supra note 33, at 1144.45.
42. FEDERAL PEGS, supra note 37.
43. TASK FORCE REPORT 80.
44. Id.
45. Many of those who are detained will not be convicted of crime; of those who are
found guilty of crime, many will not return to an institution to serve a sentence, Instead
they will be fined, placed on probation, or serve a suspended sentence. Out of 200,000
persons found guilty in New York last year, only one in ten went to prison after convl-
tion. N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 28, 1970, at 29, 30, col. 1. In Philadelphia, in 1967, only 8.1%
of the detainees were sentenced to institutions. PHILA. DrrENnXON CENrkR 17. In the
District of Columbia, approximately 10-15% of those held in detention return to a panel
institution after adjudication of the charges. Interview on May 25, 1970, with Dr. Stuart
Adams, Director, Office of Planning and Research, D.C. Department of Corrections.
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prison after conviction at trial may be surprised to find their punish-
ment less severe than the pretrial detention they suffered when they
were theoretically "presumed innocent."4 0
II.
The equal protection clause requires that those similarly classified in
a statutory or administrative scheme be similarly treated, and that classi-
fications bear a reasonable relation to a legitimate state purpose.47 In
terms of the treatment accorded them, the state has placed citizens
detained pending trial in a single class with those sentenced to jail
following conviction for a crime.48 If the state's only purpose in jailing
convicts were to maintain custody, this classification might be reason-
able in its operation.49 But a determination of guilt triggers the
legitimacy of state purposes other than custody.50 Detainees, on the
other hand, are presumed innocent of any acts which justify punitive
or mandatory rehabilitative measures. To classify detainees with con-
victs for purposes of determining the conditions of detention is,
therefore, unreasonable.
In terms of the state's legitimate purposes, citizens detained pending
trial are part of a class of arrested persons, in whom the state's only
declared interest is to ensure appearance at trial." Some of those
arrested are released on bail; others are detained, either because they
cannot afford the bail set for them52 or because they are accused of a
46. See note 2 supra.
47. For a fuller discussion of the standards used to evaluate classifications for equal
protection purposes, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAns'. L IV.
1067, 1076 et seq. (1969). See also Tussman & ten Brock, The Equal Protection of the
Laws, 37 CALF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
48. Interview, supra note 7; TAsK FORCE REPORT 24-25.
49. Though even were this the case, deprivations imposed upon inmates would have
to be tested by the requirements of due process.
50. See, e.g., the three-fold definition of punishment set forth by Herbert Packer in
TIM LIITS OF THE CRtmiNAL SA croN (1968): retribution, deterrence from further
criminal activity, and rehabilitation.
51. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951); United States v. Foster, 278 F.2d 567, 570 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 834 (1960); United States ex rel. Rubinstein v. Mulcahy, 155
F2d 1002, 1004 (2d Cir. 1946); Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa.), final
injunc. denied on other grounds, 237 F. Supp. 58 (1964).
52. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, reh. denied 351 U.S. 958 (1956), the Supreme
Court held that defendants cannot be effectively denied the right to an appeal because
of their indigence; the state had to provide a record of their trial to assure them a fair
hearing on appeal. For those detainees who are in jail solely because they are too poor
to afford the bail set for them, the decision is directly relevant. They are suffering un-
necessary deprivations in comparison to bailed persons, with whom they share the same
status in the criminal process, on the very basis which was found impermissible in
Griffin. This argument, taken to an extreme, attacks the whole principle of release on a
financial basis; it can be used instead, however, to attack the conditions suffered by those
who have no money rather than as an argument directed toward the abolition of bail.
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capital crime.53 The only basis for according different treatment to
detainees than to bailees is that maintaining custody of the former
is felt to be necessary to ensure their appearance at trial. Where pre-
ventive detention is legalized,54 another basis will become cognizable:
detention is necessary for "dangerous" defendants to prevent the com-
mission of other crimes before trial. But whether arrested persons are
detained for their risk of nonappearance or for their risk of pretrial
recidivism, the only distinction between detainees and bailees for pur-
poses of treatment is the presence or absence of a necessity for custody.
The only cases which raise this equal protection question directly"
are the lower court cases in which detainees were put into line-ups from
which the victim of crime was to identify his assailant."0 Detainees
rested their equal protection claim upon an asserted common classifica-
tion with bailees. One district court upheld that claim,57 and though
contrary decisions on line-ups have been reached since then,"8 the
principle of the decision has not been vitiated:
53. The federal government and almost all states provide that bail be set for all
crimes except capital offenses where the "proof is evident or the presumption great."
See, e.g., FED. R. Caum. P. 46; CONN. CONsr. art. 1, § 8; Miss. CoNsT. art. 3, § 29; N.J.
CONsr. art. 1, para. 11; Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 960,
977 (1961). There is also a prohibition, in the United States Constitution and In most
states, against the setting of "excessive bail." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
54. Although this reason for detention is presently unacknowledged, It may soon be
law as well as practice, at least in the federal system.
55. The issue was brought before the Supreme Court last year in an indirect way;
the Court held that failure to accord persons in custody awaiting trial certain "remedhil"
privileges does not necessarily establish an unreasonable classification violative of equal
protection. In McDonald v. Board of Election Commissioners, 394 US. 802 (1969), un-
sentenced inmates of the Cook County jail awaiting trial sought to be included among
those persons entitled to absentee ballots. Although those on bail in each election county
could vote, and the custody of the detainees would not be jeopardized by allowing them
to vote, the Court denied the appellants' relief, saying that the state had not deprived
them of any fundamental right. Rather, the provision of absentee ballots was not at all
constitutionally required, and was a privilege or "remedial" benefit which the state could
proceed slowly in granting. The Court based its refusal to give the case the strict scrutiny
that a denial of voting rights generally receives on the fact that the state had not ex-
plicitly disenfranchised detainees. There was therefore a possibility that some mechanism
would be set up to allow them to vote in jail. For a critical discussion of this assumption,
see 83 HAxv. L. REv. 82 (1969). In addition, the Court made no comparison on equal pro
tection grounds of detainees and bailees, but considered detainees in relation to those
groups, such as the physically incapacitated, which were granted ballots.
56. The line-up to which the accused objected was for a crime for which he had
not been arrested. Normally, a person cannot be put in a line.up unless there Is probable
cause to arrest him for that crime. A bailee may be asked to take part In a line.up,
but if he refuses, the police must obtain sufflcient evidence to arrest him. Butler v.
Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964). In the District of Columbia, however, a balled
person may be called in involuntarily for a line-up when he has not been arrested.
Adams v. United States, 399 F.2d 574, 578-79 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
57. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
58. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Priest v. Nardini, 390 F.2d 150 (3rd Cir. 1968); Rig.
ney v. Hendrick, 855 F.2d 710 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 384 US. 975 (1966); Morris v.
Crumlish, 239 F. Supp. 498 (E.D. Pa. 1965). The reasons set forth for the exemption of
line-ups from the equal protection principle are two. (1) Arrest is only a matter of ob.
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The constitutional authority for the state to distinguish between
criminal defendants by freeing those who supply bail pending trial
and confining those who do not, furnishes no justification for any
additional inequality of treatment beyond that which is inherent
in the confinement itself.5
9
Once the proper classification is established, the action of the state
toward the group must be evaluated to ensure that it is reasonably
related to the legitimate governmental end. 0 A line of cases holds that
where a person has not been convicted of a crime, any deprivation of
his liberty by the state must be the least restrictive means of achieving
the purpose of the deprivation. Civil commitment, sequestration, and
medical quarantine are examples of such deprivations.61 In one civil
commitment case, the District of Columbia Circuit ordered investiga-
tion of an alternative to hospitalization for an old lady; the state's
interest in treating her so that she would not be dangerous to herself
or others could be achieved in a less restrictive way.A2 The same court
held that in order to transfer an involuntary mental patient to a ward
with tighter security, a hospital must show that it is not restricting him
more than necessary to protect the community.
0 3
[T]he principle of the least restrictive alternative consistent with
the legitimate purposes of a commitment inheres in the very nature
of civil commitment, which entails an extraordinary deprivation
of liberty ... A statute sanctioning such a drastic curtailment of
raining physical custody over an individual; since the detainee is already in custody,
there is no reason to require a further arrest. Rigney v. Hendrick, supra, at 715. (2) The
courts are reluctant to challenge the line-up, since it has been constitutionally approved
as a police identification method (United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218 11967D) and is the
least suggestive of the effective police practices for identification.
59. Butler v. Crumlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964).
60. See Grisvold v. Connecticut, 381 US. 479 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500, 512 (1964); L.G. Ratner, The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA.
L. REv. 1048, 1082-93 (1968); Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alter-
native, 9 UTAH L REv. 254 (1964).
61. There are few or no cases on whether the conditions under which sequestered
juries are held are more restrictive than necessary for custody, but cases do demonstrate
the principle of the least restrictive alternative in another sense; the jury will suffer no
more restrictions than are necessary to ensure the defendant a fair trial, and fequestration
will be ordered only if no other alternative is sufficient. See, e.g., Hines v. United States,
364 F.2d 649, 651 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v. Holovachka, 314 F.2d 345, 351-53 (7th
Cir. 1963); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Corbett v. Pater-
son, 272 F. Supp. 602 (D. Colo. 1967). On quarantine see CtA.. HnuxTn AND S.4rMr, CODE,
§ 3051 (West 1970 supp.); In re Milstead, 44 Cal. App. 239, 242 (1919).
62. Lake v. Cameron, 864 F.2d 657, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Although this opinion, when
first written, was based on the District of Columbia Hospitalization of the Mentally 111
Act, 21 D.C. Code § 501 et seq., in a subsequent opinion the same court declared that it
considered its earlier holding underpinned by due process principles. Covington v.
Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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the rights of citizens must be narrowly, even grudgingly, construed
in order to avoid deprivation without due process of Iaw.
4
In summary, all restrictions on detainees must be reasonably related
to the state purpose of holding them until trial; the means used must
be no more restrictive than is required to accomplish that limited pur-
pose. Many of the current conditions are invalidated under this
principle. 5
Thus, though custody makes legitimate some restrictions on detain.
ees, the principles of equal protection and due process make many
restraints on their conduct impermissible. For example, jailers typically
deny detainees free visiting rights on the ground that they might con-
tinue to deal with past associates in crime. Yet the state has no valid
claim to regulate detainees' morality by imposing heavy restrictions on
such First Amendment rights.06 For convicts, rehabilitation is an ad-
junct of imprisonment; for detainees, it may be merely an overly
restrictive form of regulation. The strict controls on physical move-
ment and the lack of exercise space in jails are other examples of
conditions which are overly restrictive.
64. Id. at 623-24. In support of this principle, the court cited Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); and Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
65. Purely procedural due process is also a limitation on the treatment of detainees.
Compliance with due process procedural fairness is required whenever governmental
action will deprive an individual of substantial liberties. Greene v. McElroy, 360 US.
474 (1959) (government employee may not be dismissed without hearing with safeguards
of confrontation and cross-examination);" Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education,
294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 930 (1961) (due process requires that notice
and a fair hearing be afforded before a student is expelled from a tax.supported college).
The Supreme Court in the recent case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 38 U.S.L.W. 4223 (Marth
23, 1970) reviewed the elements of minimal due process which must be afforded the In-
dividual when government action of this sort is taken.
Adherence to due process has been required of prison officials when they are disci.
plining convicts. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 68 Civ. 4058 (S.D.N.Y., May 14, 1970), Morris v.
Travisono, Civil Action No. 4192 (D.C.R.I. Mar. 11, 1970) (court included in its opinion
procedural guidelines for classification and discipline procedures); Landman v. reyton, 370
F.2d 135 (4th Cir. 1966); Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966). For a full
discussion of inmate discipline, see Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights, 5 HAIv.
CIVIL PrIrrs CIVIL LIBERTm L. Rv. 227 (1970).
This procedural regularity is equally applicable and important to detainees. If a
detainee demonstrated that he was a serious security risk or if he violated rules essential
for an orderly institution, the authorities would have to heed procedural rules before
taking action to inflict particularly restrictive conditions on him, Such proceedings would
increase the accuracy and fairness of the system and would xeduce the uncertainty alld
tension which current ad hoc discipline produces.
The federal government has taken some steps in this direction by laying out rules
for discipline of federal detainees in local jails. Discipline may take only four forms,
and fair procedures must precede its imposition. The discipline may be (1) restricted
activity; (2) reduced diet; (3) solitary confinement; and (4) docking of good time, (Time
in detention is credited against eventual sentence in the federal system, though not In
most states.)
66. The only legitimate state interests in limiting visits are those of security and
administration; there is a danger of passage of contraband, and staff time Is required
to supervise visits. Even those considerations do not justify current restrictions, however,
See pp. 955-56 infra.
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It is a fundamental tenet of the American criminal system that a per-
son is presumed innocent until proven guilty;c7 he is not to be punished
before he is tried and convicted of a crime.68 This applies as strongly
to pretrial detainees as to bailees and those who have not been accused
of a crime. Accordingly, if the restrictive conditions under which de-
tainees are held constitute punishment, subjecting detainees to those
conditions violates the due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments 9 and the proscription against cruel and un-
usual punishment of the Eighth Amendment. 0
The Supreme Court has considered the question whether a sanction
constitutes punishment in cases involving deportation or deprivation of
citizenship.7' The purpose behind the government's imposition of the
sanction is the most important determining factor.J2 In cases like pre-
trial detention, where the purpose of any particular deprivation cannot
be gleaned from legislative history, the court looks to the purpose
which the sanction serves in practice.73 Unconstitutionality is estab-
lished if the real aims prove to be the traditional punitive ones of
retribution and deterrence.-4 This interpretation is reinforced if the
sanction is imposed on a group with an unusual objectionable ideol-
67. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, VI. The "presumption of innocence" is often used to refer to
standards or rules of evidence, and is shorthand for the fact that the prosecution must
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Wilson v. United States, 232 US. 563, 569-70
(1914). It is used in a more general sense here, as a statement of the Fifth Amendment
guarantee that a person will not be punished or deprived of life or liberty until he is
found deserving of such deprivation through a process guaranteeing him due process
of law. See Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report in
the Uses of Pre-trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67, 69 (1963).
68. [This] imprisonment, as has been said is only for safe custody, and not for
punishment; therefore, in this dubious interval between commitment and trial, a
prisoner ought to be used with the utmost humanity; and neither be loaded with
needless fetters, nor subjected to other hardships than such as are requiste for the
purpose of confinement only.
4 IV. BLACm rm, Cos.t r aRMs 300.
69. One of the few exceptions to the principle that punishment can only follow a
determination of guilt by due process of law, with Fifth and Sixth Amendment guar-
antees, is punishment imposed for contempt of court. Historically, this punishment can
be summarily imposed by the court without jury trial; thee power to vindicate its
authority in this way is said to inhere in a court of justice. For a discussion of the
historical roots and policy arguments surrounding this anomalous principle, see United
States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681 (1964). The Supreme Court has since limited this power
by holding that any person who receives a contempt sentence over six months in length
has a right to a jury trial. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 379-80 (1966).
70. The Eighth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
71. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US.
603 (1960) (sanction was denial of social security benefits to certain casses of deported
persons); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958); Perez v. Brownell, 356 US. 44 (1958);
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
72. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 US. 144, 169, 180 (1963).
73. See, e.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 636-37 (1960) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. Kennedy v. MAendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
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ogy or other undesirable characteristics, toward whom the legislature
is likely to have a punitive orientation. 75 Detainees, impoverished and
charged with crime, certainly fit this characterization.
Even if the sanction can be interpreted as punishment, the court may
permit it if there is an alternative governmental purpose in relation to
which the sanction is not excessive.70 With pretrial detainees, there
exists a legitimate alternative purpose of maintaining custody, but any
restrictions beyond those necessary for that purpose are excessive.
Besides the purpose of the sanction, courts look to its effect, to
determine whether it involves an affirmative disability and whether the
disability has historically been regarded as punishment. In the deporta-
tion and deprivation of citizenship cases, the Court was preoccupied
with showing that those sanctions were as severe as imprisonment.Y
Obviously, no such argument needs to be made about detention in
jail.78
The Fourth Circuit has held that prisoners suffer "superadded"
punishment over and above that of the regular routine of prison life
when they are subjected to certain particularly onerous restrictions.1 0
It found certain deprivations severe enough to be called punishment:
Prisoners in "C" building are not permitted to work and earn
money; they are allowed only two meals a day, and are deprived
of radio, television, and movie privileges; they do not have access
to the library and are not permitted to attend educational classes;
they are allowed to bathe only once a week, as opposed to daily
bathing allowed other prisoners.80
75. This aspect of the problem received lengthy consideration in all the cases, since
the sanctions were often aimed at groups susceptible to identification as Communists
or unpatriotic draftdodgers. Flemming v. Nestor, 363 US. 603, 613, 629-30 (1960) (Douglas,
J., dissenting). It is often subsumed in the question of whether the sanction is punishment,
since it must be so characterized before it can be a bill of attainder. See, e.g., Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 92-99 (1958) (Opinion of Warren, C.J.).
76. Id. at 168-69.
77. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963).
78. When we speak here of detention in jail, we mean only those conditions above
and beyond the fact of custody itself, since it is valid, and not punitive, merely to confine
detainees. However, the difference between custody in its most mild sense and life In jail
today is great enough that the conditions of detention come well within the Court's
meaning when it refers to "imprisonment" as punishment.
79. Landman v. Peyton, supra note 65; Howard v. Smyth, supra note 65; Sostre v.
Rockefeller, supra note 65 (slip opin. at 14).
Acceptance of the fact that incarceration because of inherent administrative problems
may necessitate the withdrawal of many rights and privileges does not precltde
recognition by the courts of a duty to protect the prisoner from unlawfil and onerouis
treatment . .. that, of itself, adds punitive measures to those legally meted out by
the court.
Jackson v. Godwin, 400 F.2d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 1968).
80. Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th Cir. 1966).
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Every day detainees suffer restrictions exactly like these.8' If these con-
ditions, imposed over the normal routine of prison life, constitute pun-
ishment in and of themselves, they must be labeled punishment when
imposed upon persons merely detained.8 2
If the incidents of detention amount to punishment, then that de-
tention violates the Fifth Amendment, because its imposition has not
been preceded by a procedure comporting with due process. The only
procedure which detainees have gone through is the bail hearing, at
which it has been determined that they could not afford or were not
eligible for bail. Nothing about guilt has been established. Detention
under such circumstances is so clearly disproportionate that it violates
not only due process, but also the Eighth Amendment proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment.s3
III.
Detainees can best bring these constitutional arguments before a
court by filing class actions for injunctive and declaratory relief.1s If
an action is brought instead by an individual detainee, he may lack the
resources or the interest to pursue the suit until judgment or he may
be released, in which case his action becomes moot and the court loses
jurisdiction. Courts may be more willing to grant declaratory relief
81. See pp. 942-47 supra; Foote, supra note 33, at 1144; TsK FoRea REonr 24-25.
82. There might be a jurisdictional problem, if all prisons were federal or state.run
and all detention facilities were local or county institutions, in requiring the standards
in the latter group to be higher than those in the former; counties and cities could claim
that within their system, detainees were receiving the best treatment they could provide,
and that comparison to a system with different priorities was unjustified. Strictly speaking
the factual grounds on which such an argument must be based are not present, since the
federal government does run some detention facilities; more fundamentally, however,
we are here suggesting the comparison as a general principle, not as an exact formula
to be applied to all county and local decisions about detainees.
83. The Eighth Amendment applies to detainees in two ways. Punishment is cruel
and unusual by an absolute standard if it violates basic canons of decency. Jordan v.
Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (ND. Cal. 1966); Sostre v. Rockefeller, supra note 65 (slip
opin. at 15-16). Conditions in some jails violate that standard. Punishment is also cruel
and unusual if it is totally out of proportion to the wrong toward which it is directed.
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Kasper v. Brittain, 245 F.2d 92, 96 (6th Cir.
1957). In one recent case, indefinite commitment to punitive segregation was found to be
so disproportionate to the prisoner's behavior that it constituted cruel and unusual
punishment. Sostre v. Rockefeller, supra. Detainees have not yet been found guilty
of any act; therefore the punishment is totally disproportionate. It is plausible to argue
that they are being punished solely for their status; this was found to be an imper-
missible basis for punitive action in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (196).
84. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1964). Convicts have also been bringing suits under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to complain of invasion of their civil rights. See, e.g., Sostre v. Rocke-
feller, supra note 65; Morris v. Travisono, supra note 65; for a discussion of remedies for
convicted prisoners, see Jacob, supra note 65, at 248-62.
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than habeas corpus because the appropriate remedy is not to release
the detainee but to cure the infirmities in the detention system.
It may be difficult for the court to specify the appropriate remedy
without involving itself in the day-to-day supervision of the prison
system. Some method must be found which will avoid the disruption
of the system and the waste of judicial energy which this involvement
would cause. One approach which courts have taken with success, both
in mental health cases and in the recent prison cases of Holt v. Sarocrsv
and Morris v. Travisono,8 6 is to issue a general mandate and to retain
jurisdiction, requiring administrators to submit plans and reports on
the actions taken in response to the mandate.8 7 The court might go one
step beyond this by issuing guidelines for the jail officials-setting
forth the remedial steps to be taken in a timetable.88 It would also be
helpful for the United States Bureau of Prisons to take the lead in
formulating guidelines just as the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare has done to help implement school desegregation." Ad-
85. 38 U.S.L.W. 2462, 2463 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 18, 1970).
86. Civil Action No. 4192 (D.C.R.I. Mar. 11, 1970).
87. See, e.g., People v. Bargy, case no. Cr. 32784 (Wayne Cty. Circuit Ct., Jan, 12,
1970) and Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 233 N.E.2d 908, 353
Mass. 604 (1968), both cases in which courts ordered major changes in tile provision
of treatment to involuntarily committed mental patients. In Nason, the court referred
the case to a special commissioner with the power of an auditor, whose findings were
to be final. The court then reviewed and acted upon that report, taking into account
changes made during the inquiry. The court ordered that the county court retain
jurisdiction. 233 N.E.2d at 914.
88. If progress is slow in coming, the guidelines should specify "triggering dates"
after which the court will step in to supervise personal practices as well as other aspects
of detention. This technique is validated by judicial experience in achieving constitu-
tionally required reforms in prisons. For example, in the Arkansas prison cases, the court
first required that rules be issues to cover the limited permissible use of whipping,
which the guards had been administering at will. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683
(E.D. Ark. 1965). Then, when the rules were not obeyed, the court outlawed whipping
under any circumstances. Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark. 1967). Having
now determined that the guards, particularly those prisoner "trusties," are largely un-
affected by its restrictions, the court has declared that their replacement by more qualiflcd
personnel is constitutionally mandated. Holt v. Sarver, 38 U.S.L.W. 2462 (E.D. Ark, Feb.
18, 1970). While courts have observed the principle that prison administrators are not
relieved of their responsibilities "by personal ignorance of abuses practiced" (Talley,
supra at 692) by their subordinates, such observations alone do not bring about change,
The only viable alternative to the "trigger" device is to hold jail officials in contempt If
guidelines are not complied with, and this is less attractive because it tends to confuse
the need for changes in the system with the question of official accountability.
89. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare guidelines for plans for de-
segregation of schools cover assignment of pupils, faculty hiring and dismissal policy,
and desegregation of school services, activities, and facilities. They require that the
schools keep records of the changes, and there is a periodic reporting requirement.
45 C.F.R. § 181 (Supp. 1968). For cases in which the courts have reviewed and supervised
the application of these guidelines and the local plans drawn up in conformity with them,
see, e.g., Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 420 (1968):
Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School District, 409 F.2d 682 (5th C:r. 1969),
Franklin v. Quitman County Board of Education, 288 F, Supp. 509 (1968).
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ministrators of state and municipal detention centers would be pres-
sured to follow its example.
Courts passing on detainees' suits will have the delicate job of weigh-
ing the detainees' valid claims against serious objections raised by jail
administrators. All these objections can be traced to the one problem
of insufficient resources; administrators will claim that they do the best
they can with what they have, but given their resources, the restric-
tions they impose are necessary, in light of security and administrative
needs, to hold detainees until trial °0 A very small percentage of deter-
mined troublemakers can disrupt the whole jail routine; the lack of
professional staff to administer classification procedures and the diffi-
culty of assessing an individual's attitude in a short period of time
mean that maximum security is required for everyone to preclude the
possibility of trouble.9' It is arguable that preserving custody of detain-
ees with the present level of resources (1) necessitates all differences in
treatment betveen them and bailees, (2) cannot be done by any less
restrictive means, and (3) serves the purpose of ensuring the defen-
dants' appearance at trial. In view of these considerations, the admin-
istrators' actions seem less excessive.
In one sense, the argument is substantial; providing a normal civilian
life for detainees would mean providing so many facilities, senrices and
personnel that it would create an intolerable burden on the resources
of the state. In another sense, however, the argument is preposterous;
maintaining secure custody requires only a large, controllable space, not
censorship of mail or confinement in a tiny, locked cell. Not only are
resources misspent on unnecessary restrictions like censorship; even if
all resources were spent properly, they might be inadequate. If the level
of resources is always taken as given, it can justify anything-even de-
priving detainees to the point of starving them, were the level lower.92
90. In Jordan v. Fitzharris, supra n.83, the testimony of the prison authorities shows
that understaffing and lack of money lay behind the deplorable conditions in the prison.
257 F. Supp. at 680-81. The same was true in Holt v. Sarver, supra note 88. See also TASK
FoRcE REPoRT 166; MATAcK S_ AIRMAuN 113. This problem, of course, cannot be blamed
mainly on the administrators themselves; the legislature and the public are unwilling to
commit resources to the care of prisoners, a group low on the list of social prioritles.
However, it is true that in the past many administrators were quite content with the
status quo and did little to attract more money to the jails. Now, many of them are trying
to institute experimental programs which would not be expensive, but are chafing under
the financial limitations which curtail their efforts to reform their institutions.
91. Interview, supra note 45.
92. This extreme example illustrates another framework within which the duties of
jail officials are often cast. The distinction is drawn between negative restrictions and
affirmative duties; it is said to be permissible to require the former to be lifted, but
more difficult to demand that the latter be put into effect. Although this sounds logically
neat, it is not even seriously used by jail administrators themselves; they admit that
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Constitutional decisions in analogous areas have begun to challenge
the claim of inadequate resources. In Rouse v. Cameron, 3 the D.C.
Circuit held that the scarcity of resources is an insufficient justification
for the state's failure to fulfill its promise to treat mental patients
whom it has confined against their will:
Continuing failure to provide suitable and adequate treatment
cannot be justified by lack of staff or facilities. As the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals said of the right to treatment under Mary-
land's defective delinquent statute, "deficiencies in staff, facilities,
and finances... would undermine... the justification for the law
and ultimately the constitutionality of its application."
9 4
Nor has the argument from scarce resources been persuasive in the
prison area itself. In finding that prisoners must be allowed to exercise
certain rights, courts have implicitly rejected jailers' arguments based
on the drain on resources which any change in procedures would
entail.9 5
The principles which have led courts to set standards for the confine-
ment of convicts have even greater force in their application to
conditions of pretrial detention. The state has the same interest in
preserving the custody of convicts that it has in detainees, and a cer-
tain degree of control over their actions is justified. Although further
control over convicts is justified by the additional state interests in
retribution, deterrence of future criminal activity and rehabilitation,
these interests are lacking in the case of detainees, and no other offset-
ting justifications for control of detainees have been adduced. At a min-
imum, then, the state or jailer must never be allowed more control over
there are many affirmative duties, such as feeding the inmates, that they have an obliga-
tion to fulfill. Evaluation of the point at which they feel that they must do no more
is much more honestly stated in terms of available resources.
93. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
94. Id. at 457.
95. Court action has resulted in the expenditure of extra funds when the courts have
ordered prison officials to upgrade the condition of the solitary cells and of the service,
provided prisoners there, as in Jordan v. Fitzharris, supra n.83, and Wright v. McMann,
387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967). In Landman v. Peyton, supra n.65, the court strongly urged
the prison authorities to change their handling of the maximum security units, It
mentioned conferences for airing grievances, frequent inspections, and training for the
guards. 370 F.2d at 140-41. All these changes would cost money; although they have not
yet been constitutionally required, the court suggests that if the changes are not made
voluntarily, it will so order. Last year, the District of Columbia Circuit remanded a case
in which Muslim prisoners claimed that they had a right to pork-free meals, the court
held that in order to be justified in refusing to comply with that request, the prison
authorities would have to show compelling reasons. The court suggested It would not
consider the extra staff time and expense required to adjust the menu for such a compel.
ling reason.
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detainees than convicts.96 Accordingly, any prison practice which is un-
constitutional as applied to those convicted of crime would a fortiori
be unconstitutional if imposed on those who are only accused of crime.
Moreover, the difference in the legitimate state interests in convicts
and detainees suggest that detainees must be treated better. Censoring
convicts' mail and limiting the volume and destination of the mail they
send have been held valid on grounds of retribution and deterrence
from involvement with past associates in crime. Neither of these
grounds applies to detainees. If the justification of maintaining custody
is lacking, the practice must be discontinued. For the same reasons,
guidelines for the treatment of detainees should ease all the restric-
tions which convicts suffer except those justified by custody alone.
One of the most important objects of such guidelines should be to
improve jail facilities. This effect may also be one of the most difficult
to achieve. First, immediate provisions should be made to house detain-
ees separately from convicts. 97 Beyond that, guidelines should set mini-
mum levels of space per detainee, provide for the necessary common
rooms (such as visiting halls), and specify the steps which must be taken
to phase out the old maximum security jailhouses and to replace them
with modem, well-equipped structures with varying levels of security.0s
96. The court in Tyler v. Ciccone, 229 F. Supp. 654 (W.D. Mo. 1969), prohibited the
application of the rules on mailing and publishing manuscripts to an inmate who had not
yet been tried for a crime. The court said:
Regulations of the type here challenged, to be valid as applied even to convicts,
must be consistent with constitutional safeguards, authorized by statute, and relevant
to the lawful functions and security of the prison. . . . While the Constitution
authorizes forfeiture of some rights of convicts, it does not authorize treatment of an
unconvicted person (who is necessarily presumed innocent of pending and untried
criminal charges) as a convict. Unconvicted persons charged with crime are entitled
to the rights of free speech and to do business accorded to all unconvicted citizens.
The challenged regulation . . . deprived the unconvicted inmate of fundamental
constitutional rights and cannot therefore be enforced against him.
299 F. Supp. at 687-88.
97. Separation of detainees from convicted prisoners has been long recognized as an
essential first step in bettering the treatment of detainees. TAsK Force Rrre- 24. To be
meaningful, it must be accompanied by provision of services and conditions of confine-
ment which are appropriate for persons presumed innocent.
98. Security is an operational term which takes in all characteristics of the institution
which keep it peaceful and secure, including physical layout, walls, use of guns, or
conceivably, lack of desire by the inmates to leave the surroundings. Therefore, the fact
that the living space is dormitories does not in itself mean that the prison is more
progressive or less severe than those with cells. However, old buildings rarely had
dormitories (with mixed single rooms and shared living. quarters and common rooms),
so they are at least a sign that old methods are being discarded, and that the hardship
of extremely restricted living space is alleviated. ACA MANUAL 332-333. Interview, suptfa
note 7. Maximum security has been found unnecessary for 80% of the jail population
under the most extreme circumstances. MiL ALEXANDER, JAIL AaDMINMRATi0o 284 (1957).
"Maximum security in most jails is needed for no more than one or two cells. The other
cells could and should be minimum security accommodations." N.C. JAIL Co!tm'N, supra
note 13, at 5. The arrangement ought to have some private rooms and some multi-person
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-Even more important than buildings, and an aspect of detention
somewhat more easily governed by guidelines, is the staff which is ul-
timately responsible for implementing the court-ordered changes. Per-
sonnel must be greatly increased in number and dramatically upgraded
in quality.99 To attract properly qualified persons, civil service proce-
dures should be substituted for politics and patronage in staff selection,
and salary levels should be increased over the present average of under
$5,000 a year.100 The self-administering course now in use by the Fed-
eral Bureau of Prisons should be taken as a model for the minimum
level of acceptable training.10'
Along with improvements in staff, the guidelines should require that
more attention be given to the basic personal needs of detainees. For
example, each system housing more than a few hundred inmates should
have a professional dietician, and smaller systems should employ a stan-
dard food program designed to assure balanced nutrition in the jail-
house diet. Each jail should have adequate medical facilities and per-
sonnel, on either a contract or full-time basis.102 The guidelines should
specify how the staff can use the various public or volunteer services
which are available in the community to assist detainees in overcoming
the social, legal and personal problems created by detention.
103
Guidelines for eliminating restrictions on First Amendment rights
should be the easiest to formulate, and also the easiest for the state
to follow, since they would require a minimal sacrifice of resources.
Detainees should be allowed to receive incoming mail of all sorts-
books and periodicals as well as letters-without censorship. Jailers
claim that some reading material may incite to riot, but it is most un-
likely that anything detainees read would threaten the order of the con-
living quarters. To utilize properly this variety in the level of security, classification pro-
cedures must be used to assign detainees to the suitable area. The Federal Bureau of
Prisons has formulated and is testing a questionnaire that will gather the relevant facts
for this determination; the questionnaire is simple and can be administered during the
booking process. Such a procedure would identify the few persons who need single rooms
and high level security. If transfers are warranted, they can be made later. The present
random and uninformd assignment procedure often makes a dormitory fearful because of
one or tvo unruly individuals. Interview, supra note 45.
99. In addition to an absolute rise in number of personnel, a change in the proportion
of guards to other staff must take place. More professional and skilled positions must be
created; health care personnel, dieticians, social workers, and community resources coun-
selors are examples of the job designations which need emphasis. See MATrCK & AIKMIAN
112.
100. TASK FORcE RPoRT 165.
101. For a description of the Bureau of Prisons correspondence course, see the ACA
MANUAL 52.
102. The doctor, or some health personnel, should be located close enough to the jail
that entrance examinations can be administered on a regular basis.
103. Interview, supra note 7.
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trolled environment of the jail.10 4 The only control on incoming mail
should be an inspection for contraband such as escape tools or narcotics.
Similarly, there is no need to limit outgoing mail,1°5 and provision
should be made for detainees to purchase writing materials and
stamps.'0 6 Each detainee should also be provided with a secure locker
in which to keep his personal belongings, open to inspection only on
"probable cause."
The guidelines should also provide for removing the many restric-
tions on visits and calls. 07 Personal visits can be supervised to prevent
passage of contraband, but detainees must be allowed to see whomever
they want. There are security and administrative problems with the
presence of contraband in jail, and the staff time required to monitor
visits would be great. Therefore, guidelines on this point would have
to be carefully and reasonably drawn. Likewise, there is no reason for
an absolute prohibition on telephone calls; instead, an adequate num-
ber of pay phones should be available in each jail. The hours for visits
and calls should be extended to include weekend hours and evening
hours during the week.
If guidelines like these are followed, it will be impossible to handle
the present flow of detainees without expending more resources. The
state could reduce the number of detainees held to ensure their appear-
ance at trial; release on recognizance programs suggest that if there is
proper screening and supervision an extremely small percentage of those
104. In a jail setting, First Amendment rights should not be restricted unless there is
a dear and present danger to the security of the institution from the reading matter
in question. It is hard to believe that such would ever be the case. For a discussion of
this standard, see, e.g., Abrams v. California, 250 US. 616 (1919) (Holmes, J. and
Brandeis, J., dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). For a good discussion of freedom of expression in prison,
see Sostre v. Rockefeller, supra note 65 (slip opinion at 27-32).
105. On mail addressed to public officials, see Barkin, supra note 3, at 15-16; Sostre v.
Rockefeller, supra note 65 (slip opinion at 22-26).
106. At present, detainees are not allowed to have money in jail; it is "contraband"
which is held for them until they are released. (By "contraband" we mean anything
that the jail rules, or the sheriff, does not permit the inmates to possess; it usually
indudes escape tools, money, and narcotics.) The ban on money seems an unreasonable
limitation on detainees; they cannot buy supplies or services they may need. Although
there is danger of manipulation of some detainees by others if money is available,
it should be permitted for a trial period. If it proves too disruptive, then detainees should
at least be able to have an account in the jail where he can deposit funds and buy
stamps or make phone calls.
107. Visits and calls are particularly necessary to effective preparation for trial. At
present, detainees are far more likely than bailees to be convicted and to serve longer
sentences. This remains true when all other variables are held constant. See Rankin, The
Effect of Pre-trial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641 (1964). Much of this prejudice stems
from their inability to communicate freely with their lawyers and potential witnesses. If
their rights were more carefully protected in jail, some of this prejudice might be
alleviated.
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released fail to appear at trial.108 The state could also rechannel the
approximately six dollars a day per man which it now spends to hold
people in detention 00 to hire additional court personnel and to im-
prove scheduling in order to move detainees through the system faster.
The administrative burden will be aggravated if the preventive de-
tention laws bring a new influx of detainees. For these people too, the
state will be allocating to detention resources which it might spend to
assure speedier trials. In the interim, however, and for those who even
under optimal circumstances will be detained for some period of
time, correctional authorities will have to make major changes in the
operation of their institutions so that individuals who are presumed
innocent are confined under conditions which meet constitutional stan-
dards.
108. When cities and states have begun to use release without bail, on the defetidant's
own recognizance, they have found that no more than a few percent of those released
fail to appear; the percentage is lower than for those defendants freed on baill bond.
O'REiLLy AND FLANAGAN, MEN IN DETENTION 2 (1967). There are some indications that
as the release on recognizance programs lose their novelty, they tend to be inadequately
staffed, funded, and supervised, and to show somewhat higher non-appearance rates than
did the early, well-funded programs. Even so, the percentage who do not show Is
often less than the default rate on bond or non-secured cash release.
109. The cost per detainee per day varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In Chicago,
it is $3.12 per day; Id. at 10. In North Carolina, on the average it is $3.00-$9.00 a day.
N.C. JAIL COMm'N, supra note 13, at 19. In New York, it was in excess of $4 a day In
1958. The total cost of detention services in New York in fiscal 1954-55 was over $5 million.
A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, supra note 15, at 723.
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